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Nanotechnologies are expected to be the dominant general purpose
technology of the next decades. Their market potential is immense and
not only supply-side but especially demand-side arguments will have
far reaching consequences for innovations. The latter may occur as in-
creased miniaturization or via building completely new products, pro-
cesses or services. Innovations in the field of nanotechnologies do not
only aﬀect productivity in downstream sectors but these feed back to
nanotechnologies thereby inducing circles of continuing innovation.
Demand for nano-components mainly arises from firms while private
demand is assigned to final products, processes or services that are
augmented by nanotechnologies. Due to the technology’s controversial
character, the consumer’s attitude towards risk and technology aﬀects
private demand and this may either spur or hamper innovation. The
paper aims to unravel how these complex interdependencies and feed-
back mechanisms aﬀect overall innovation in downstream sectors that
is induced by nanotechnologies and how this for its part aﬀects further
improvements of nanotechnologies.
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Introduction
Future decades are expected to be largely dominated by increased utiliza-
tion and spread of nanotechnologies. This term broadly refers to tech-
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nologies and devices whose unifying theme is the control of matter at
an atomic and molecular scale, namely with critical dimensions smaller
than 100 nanometers. The manipulation of nanostructures leads to the
observation of completely new phenomena and with this prepares the
ground for considerable innovations. The goal of this paper is to give an
overview on some most important lines of argumentations relevant in
the context of the complex innovation process of nanotechnologies. In
doing so the paper provides a theoretical framework for discussing the
potential but also possible frictions of that newly emerging technology.
Permanent innovation is especially important for those countries that
are poorly endowed with natural resources in order to be competitive at
an international level and to realize ongoing growth (see e. g. Barro and
Sala-i-Martin 2004; Acemoglu 2009 for a recent overview on the link be-
tween innovation and growth). A more precise look at innovation deter-
minants reveals that it is possible for most eras to identify a certain tech-
nology that has a key function for the generation of innovations in other
fields (see e. g. Rosenberg 1992). This has led to the distinction in dras-
tic and incremental innovations. Drastic innovations frequently spur in-
cremental innovations in complementary fields thereby introducing far-
reaching economic and societal eﬀects. If drastic innovations have the
potential for pervasive utilization – as e. g. the steam engine, electricity
or the computer – they are called general purpose technologies (see e. g.
Bresnahan and Trajtenberg 1995 who coined that term).
Although they may basically be used in a variety of applications this
neither implies any automatism concerning diﬀusion nor that eﬃciency
considerations are the only determinant driving demand for the new
technology. This argument becomes strikingly obvious in the context of
so-called controversial technologies – a notion stating that it is not per se
clear whether, from an aggregate point of view, chances or possible risks
of the innovation dominate (biotechnology or nuclear power are some
prominent examples of such a kind of technology). Given this, individual
attitudes towards technologies and risk become important for the devel-
opment and diﬀusion of the innovation. In the extreme, failing public
acceptance may interrupt the innovation process.
One might conclude that usually innovation processes are driven by
demand-side as well as by supply-side arguments, in which each position
holds a certain role. Throughout this paper supply-side arguments will be
discussed in the context of general purpose technologies, thereby includ-
ing a microeconomic and a macroeconomic perspective. From the point
of view of single firms, the most important are externalities and feedback
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eﬀects that arise along the value chain. As a consequence too few inno-
vations are realized, and on top of that they arise too late. The aggre-
gate perspective adds further arguments, namely the impact of general
purpose technologies on total factor productivity. Following the logic of
the so-called productivity paradox, the implementation of a new general
purpose technology only enhances overall productivity in the long-run
whereas, due to costly adjustment processes, in the short-run even pro-
ductivity losses may arise. A second perspective focuses on demand-side
arguments mainly arising in the context of controversial technologies.
These approaches do not focus on pure technological aspects but lay em-
phasis on the needs, preferences and the utility of the users.
Several features qualify nanotechnologies as the future dominating
general purpose technology. One is pervasiveness, since the technology
may be utilized in lots of animate and inanimate fields. Due to their tini-
ness nanotechnologies are used at the origins of the value creation chain
and induce high technological dynamics. Improvements in nanotech-
nologies also aﬀect productivity in the downstream sectors, which due
to technological dynamics, again spurs innovation in the upstream tech-
nology. As a consequence, not only production but also innovation pro-
cesses are vertically linked, at which the latter interdependency runs in
both directions along the value creation chain. But aside from this, nan-
otechnologies are also understood as representing a controversial technol-
ogy and great eﬀorts are made to avoid interruptions in the innovation
process that might arise as a consequence of failing public acceptance.
The remainder of the paper is as follows: the second section presents
determinants and economic aspects of general purpose technologies.
The third section analyzes supply-side and demand-side arguments of
innovation in the case of controversial technologies. The fourth section
applies the arguments detailed before on the case of nanotechnologies.
The fifth section briefly concludes.
Economic Aspects of General Purpose Technologies
drastic versus incremental innovations
In the simplest form, technological progress arises as an incremental pro-
cess that improves the eﬃciency of resource deployment. It may not be
uniform across sectors or time, but the aggregate eﬀects are relatively
smooth.¹ In contrast are major inventions that have had far-reaching
and prolonged implications, such as the steam engine, electricity, or the
computer. The distinction between drastic and incremental innovation is
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useful, since frequently incremental innovations – although taking place
in the regular course of business – follow drastic innovations. A drastic
innovation, however, introduces a discontinuity in the organization of
the economy in the sense that the innovation replaces an old technology
that played a significant role in an industry with new methods of pro-
duction. Or it replaces an old material that performed certain functions
with a new one.²
Note that a discontinuity in this sense does not automatically imply
a necessary discontinuity in the observed pattern of resource allocation
or the evolution of output. The introduction of a superior technology
can be gradual, starting with a negligible absorption of resources which
is followed by continuous expansion over time.³ It is nevertheless helpful
to distinguish between drastic and incremental innovations since the lat-
ter frequently are triggered by drastic innovations. Put diﬀerently, drastic
innovations induce series of incremental (and often complementary) in-
novations.
The distinction between drastic and incremental innovations is also
helpful with respect to their emergence: It is possible that forces driving
incremental innovations are diﬀerent from those that drive drastic inno-
vations. For example, incremental innovations are more susceptible to
standard profitability calculations, even when they involve externalities
and are subject to risk, simply because markets can evaluate their prof-
itability. In contrast, drastic innovations face much larger uncertainties,
producing risks that are much harder to evaluate by the market (see e. g.
Rosenberg 1996). As a result, drastic innovators can engage little in risk-
sharing and have to bear most of the risk themselves.⁴
peculiarities of general purpose technologies
A drastic innovation qualifies as general purpose technology if it has the
potential for pervasive use in a wide range of sectors in ways that dras-
tically change their modes of operation. To quote from Bresnahan and
Trajtenberg (1995), who coined the term general purpose technology and
provided a highly original discussion of its usefulness:⁵
Most gpts play the role of ‘enabling technologies,’ opening up new oppor-
tunities rather than oﬀering complete, final solutions. For example, the
productivity gains associated with the introduction of electric motors in
manufacturing were not limited to a reduction in energy costs. The new
energy sources fostered the more eﬃcient design of factories, taking ad-
vantage of the newfound flexibility of electric power. Similarly, the users
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figure 1 Generality of purpose and innovational complementarities (gpt – general
purpose technology; as – applying sector)
of microelectronics benefit from the surging power of silicon by wrap-
ping around the integrated circuits their own technical advantages. This
phenomenon involves what we call ‘innovational complementarities’ (ic),
that is, the productivity of r&d in a downstream sector increases as a con-
sequence of innovation in the gpt. These complementarities magnify the
eﬀects of innovation in the gpt, and help propagate them throughout the
economy.
The description makes clear two most important features of drastic
innovations that qualify as general purpose technologies: generality of
purpose as well as innovational complementarities.⁶ When these eﬀects
are particularly strong, as for example in the case of electricity, infor-
mation and communication technologies and the internet or henceforth
nanotechnologies, they lead to considerable changes in economic orga-
nizations. Sometimes they also aﬀect the organization of society through
changes in working hours, constraints of family life, social stratification,
and the like.⁷
One immediate consequence of pervasiveness are strong interdepen-
dencies between lots of actors along the value creation chain. Figure 1
contains a technology tree that illustrates horizontal and vertical link-
ages, that arise between the general purpose technology (denoted by
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gpt) and downstream sectors (applying sectors, hence as) which ap-
ply the technology. The generality of purpose is indicated by the verti-
cal linkages while horizontal lines between the applying sectors illustrate
that also firms at the same level of the value creation chain are basically
interrelated. Figure 1 also contains two innovation processes (from the
pure idea until diﬀusion) which are indicated by the outside arrows. One
innovation process begins at the level of the general purpose technol-
ogy and works downwards along the value creation chain. Diﬀusion then
takes places via utilization of the general purpose technology in down-
stream sectors in which the technology plays the role of an intermediate
input, and diﬀusion along the technology tree takes place in the form of
a cascade. Additionally, figure 1 encompasses a second innovation pro-
cess which, in turn, comes from the applying sector and goes back to
the general purpose technology and hence runs upwards along the value
creation chain. This indicates that inherent to the general purpose tech-
nology there is the potential of technological improvement that runs in
two directions.⁸ The utilization of the general purpose technology by the
downstream firms reveals potential for improvement and hence induces
innovation processes in the upstream sector, namely the general purpose
technology. This, in turn, induces improvements in the upstream general
purpose technology which again feed back to downstream sectors and so
forth.
As argued in the context of figure 1, numerous interactions exist be-
tween upstream and downstream sectors. These interdependencies do
not only arise in a production context but also during the innova-
tion processes within companies. They incorporate two fundamental
externalities:⁹
• Vertical externalities. Due to innovational complementarities, the
innovation activities in upstream and downstream industries are
related, and firms in upstream and downstream sectors have linked
payoﬀs. As long as each firm decides individually, it does not con-
sider the aggregate eﬀects arising from its individual action. Con-
sequently, the well-known appropriability eﬀect (namely the failing
to appropriate the entire returns of individual activities) arises (see
Helpman and Trajtenberg 1998). A familiar problem of imperfect
access to the social returns arises, except that in the context of gen-
eral purpose technologies it runs in both ways. This encompasses
a bilateral moral hazard problem which implies that not any side,
neither the upstream nor the downstream firm, will have suﬃcient
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incentives to innovate. As a consequence, the innovation incentives
along the entire value creation chain are too little with respect to the
extent and arise too late.
• Horizontal externalities. Applying sectors include actual and possi-
ble users of the general purpose technology. Their demand depends
positively upon the quality and negatively upon the price of the
general purpose technology. At the same time, quality within the
general purpose technology sector depends on marginal produc-
tion costs and on the (aggregate) technological level of all applying
sectors. Hence, if one single applying sector innovates to increase its
own technological level (with the goal of reducing own production
costs) also the aggregate level of all applying sectors will increase.
This leads to improvements within the general purpose technology
and hence to reduced costs not only in the originally innovating
sector but also in the other (non-innovating) downstream sectors.
However, as argued before, again the appropriability eﬀect comes
into action, and again this induces a moral hazard problem: Why
should any applying sector innovate if it could benefit at zero costs
from the innovation in another sector?
To sum up: As Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) noted, general pur-
pose technologies introduce two types of externalities: one between the
general purpose technology and the application sectors (vertical); an-
other across the application sectors (horizontal). The former stems from
the diﬃculties that an inventor of the general purpose technology may
have in appropriating the fruits of the invention. When institutional
conditions prevent full appropriation, the general purpose technology
is eﬀectively underpriced and therefore undersupplied. The latter occurs
since the application sectors are not coordinated and each one conditions
its expansion of the available general purpose technology. If in contrast
they coordinated a joint expansion, they would raise the profitability of
the general purpose technology and encourage its improvement. A bet-
ter general purpose technology fits them all. Consequently, coordination
of a joint expansion – and with this the conditions of demand – are of
major importance for the diﬀusion and thus improvement of the general
purpose technology, which in the end benefits all.
general purpose technologies and aggregate growth
From an economic point of view, general purpose technologies are not
only interesting from a microeconomic perspective but they have also
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some peculiarities with respect to their aggregate eﬀect or, to be more
precise, for aggregate growth. As has been widely shown by economic
historians, in any given period, there exist some technologies that play
a far-reaching role in the sense that they bring about sustained and per-
vasive productivity gains and which, in consequence, widely foster eco-
nomic growth. Some examples are the steam engine during the industrial
revolution, electricity during the first decades, or microelectronics in the
second half of the 20th century. Nanotechnologies are expected to induce
the next long-run wave.¹⁰ The basic argumentation is as follows: As an
improved version of the general purpose technology becomes available
it gets adopted by an increasing number of application sectors which, in
turn, are accompanied by further advances, thus raising the attractive-
ness of further adoption. This increases the demand for the general pur-
pose technology, thereby inducing improvements of the general purpose
technology, which then prompts a new round of advances in the applica-
tion sectors, and so forth. As the eﬀects become significant at an aggre-
gate level, the general purpose technology finally aﬀects overall growth.
However, even if substantially important in the long-run, new technolo-
gies may at first have no significant impact on actual growth, since they
have to await for the development of a suﬃciently large amount of com-
plementary assets in the applying sector. Moreover, these assets use up
resources and hence, in the short nun, growth may even be negatively
aﬀected.
This latter aspect of the so-called ‘productivity paradox’ has been for-
malized e. g. by Helpman and Trajtenberg (1998) who develop a growth
model which allows for studying the economy-wide dynamics that the
emergence of a new general purpose technology may generate. Within
this paper we just present a short sketch of the model’s simplest version
without going into formal details, thereby assuming that advances in the
general purpose technology are exogenous. Hence we abstract from ana-
lyzing the implications of innovational complementarities illustrated be-
fore. To keep the discussion simple we focus on the role of complemen-
tarity in the sense that the downstream sectors, which provide compo-
nents that are complementary to the general purpose technology, and
their incentives for innovation are of primary interest.¹¹ Figure 2 pro-
vides a simple illustration of the relevant interdependencies.
Figure 2 contains a stylized sequence of the emergence of a new general
purpose technology which contains three cycles. Each cycle is denoted by
Δ and describes a phase in which a certain general purpose technology,
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figure 2 The importance of complements (T1 – availability of gpt1, start of
development of components for gpti+1, Ti + Δ1 – switch in the fps to
gpti+1, Δ – phase in which a general purpose technology is available; Δ1 –
phase with productivity decline; Δ2 – phase with productivity growth; λi –
general purpose technology at work; fps – final product sector; r&d –
research and development)
denoted by λi, is at work. The positive parameter i is ordinal and indi-
cates the consecutive number of the current general purpose technology.
The parameter λ is assumed to exceed unity, hence a newer gpt implies
higher values of λi.
Since the general purpose technology is not a lonely standing tech-
nology but is applied to a variety of uses we distinguish the utilization
within the final product sector (denoted by fps) and in the component
sector (denoted by r&d). Each cycle is divided in to two phases, Δ1 and
Δ2; both may be distinguished as follows: Within the first phase, Δ1, fi-
nal output is manufactured with the old general purpose technology, λi,
while innovators already develop components for the new general pur-
pose technology, λi+1. Consequently, the number of components for λi+1
rises over time. Note that the development of components for the next
technology comes at the cost of negative output and productivity growth,
stagnating real wages, and declining profit shares. In the second phase,
Δ2, after a suﬃcient amount of components for the new general purpose
technology has been developed, manufacturers of final output switch to
the new technology, λi+1, while innovators still continue to develop com-
ponents for this technology. Then the benefits of an advanced general
purpose technology manifest themselves. As a consequence, output, real
wages, and profits rise.
In figure 2 this becomes apparent while looking at the general purpose
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technology at work within the separate sectors, namely the sectors for
final goods production and the one for the development of components:
While during Δ1 two diﬀerent general purpose technologies (e. g. λ1 and
λ2) aﬀect economic activity in the respective sector, Δ2 is characterized
by the overall utilization of the most recent general purpose technology
(e. g. λ2) in both the component and the final product sector.
To sum up: Within each cycle, the analysis shows the centrality that
complementary investments play in the aggregate growth process. Above
it is shown how the sequential and cumulative nature of such comple-
mentary investments may induce diﬀerent phases along each cycle, each
of them exhibiting very diﬀerent features. Of special interest is the ini-
tial phase of negative or below average growth. This results from the fact
that there exists a threshold level of complementary inputs that needs
to be developed before the general purpose technology at work in final
goods’ production can be displaced by the newest one. Hence one has to
carefully consider the time line in assessing the growth impact of general
purpose technologies: while aggregate growth increases in the long-run
due to productivity gains of the improved gpt and the complementary
components (second phase), productivity initially declines as a conse-
quence of parallel use of two gpt during the first phase.
Innovation and International Competitiveness
supply and demand side arguments
Until here the argumentation referred to the interdependencies between
upstream and downstream sectors, the arising coordination problem
that ends up in too little and too late innovation, and delayed growth
eﬀects induced by the general purpose technology. This perspective al-
ready underlines the fundamental point of the development of general
purpose technologies, namely the role of demand. As we argue along the
technology tree, not only demand for final products but also firms’ de-
mands that arise along the value creation chain gains importance.
As argued before, those theories that focus on the supply-side fre-
quently stress the implications of knowledge as (at least a partial) pub-
lic good. Innovative firms are not able to appropriate all returns that
are generated by their innovation activities while they have to cover the
entire costs. Consequently the incentive for innovation is sub-optimally
low and the innovation process is accompanied by market failures. This
justifies governmental intervention in the innovation process frequently
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in the form of direct or indirect subsidies.¹² In addition, supply of new
products, processes or services is also aﬀected by national tax systems,
the availability of qualified labor or other input factors, as well as by co-
operation possibilities with component suppliers or other firms.
In contrast to this a relevant impact for continuous innovation stems
from ambitious customers, the market structure as well as from econo-
mies of scale and scope in production. Picking up this argument, other
approaches emphasize the role of the demand-side for the generation of
knowledge, innovation and international competitiveness (see e. g. Lin-
der 1961; Blümle 1994; Fagerberg 1995). These approaches do not focus on
pure technological aspects but lay an emphasis on the needs and the util-
ity of the users. Summarizing these arguments, Beise and Cleﬀ (2004) or
Gerybadze, Meyer-Kramer, and Reger (1997) focus on so called lead mar-
kets that enable promising technologies to emerge. Lead markets arise if
there exists a critical amount of users, whose needs determine the quality
of demand. Lead users (in contrast to ‘normal users’) may be character-
ized as follows: (i) they are precursors of a broad commercial market and
hence early anticipators of global trends, (ii) they expect high utility from
new products, processes or services, (iii) they claim for the implantation
of ideas and inventions in final products, processes and services, and (iv)
fall back on local resources. Aside from private individuals or firms, also
governments may become lead users, e. g. by buying special products or
services or by issuing research orders for them. Typically, the government
is especially important in the field of cutting edge technologies, such as
information and communication technology, aerospace industry or mil-
itary technology.
lead markets and competitiveness of local firms
The existence of a domestic lead market and hence high demand with
respect to quantity, but also to quality, allows supplying firms first to
meet local demand, then to activate exports and eventually to provide
products, processes and services to a broad range of users and on inter-
national markets.¹³ Due to the market proximity local firms will be the
first to notice the demand of new lead users. In detail the advantages can
be grouped into:
• Cost advantages. Research and technology intensive industries are
frequently characterized by economies of scale and scope. Hence,
to benefit from the corresponding scale and scope eﬀects in the
form of cost degression, not only the current volume of domestic
Volume 7 · Number 1 · Spring 2009
16 Ingrid Ott, Christian Papilloud, and Torben Zülsdorf
demand but also the corresponding dynamics (the growth of de-
mand) are important to assure international competitiveness. The
positive scale eﬀects are then magnified by the market volume.
• Export advantages. This summarizes eﬀects such as representativity
of domestic preferences for the world market, sensibility compared
to changes of the demand conditions on the world market, the ex-
port ratio, but also linguistic and social compatibility with the ad-
vised market. Hence export advantages may arise if consumers on
the home market prefer products and processes that have the po-
tential to be successful also on other markets (see e. g. Beise 2001).
Firms in leadmarkets are the first to benefit from these advantages and
this continuously secures a competitive advantage for innovative domes-
tic firms (see e. g. Morrison, Roberts, and Midgley 2004)
on the role of private demand for controversial
technologies
Inherent in innovative products and services is uncertainty. Therefore,
individual risk attitude and risk perception become crucial for the actu-
ally existing private demand. The individual attitude towards technology
and science also aﬀect the preferences of domestic consumers. Individual
openness towards new technologies is significantly aﬀected by both an-
ticipated utility and perceived risks. Slovic (1999) emphasizes that most
notably the risk potential, its possible way to control it, the familiarity
with risks and the public recognition determines how private individ-
uals perceive innovations and hence drives demand for new products,
processes or services. The following arguments gain especial importance:
• Openness towards technology and science. Inglehart (1997) states that
a positive climate for innovation is the more probable, the more
open-minded and tolerant a society is, since openness aﬀects pri-
vate demand for new products and services. Demand is at least in
part aﬀected by individual attitudes (openness towards new tech-
nologies, risk attitude – see below) as well as by norms that shape
human interaction.¹⁴ Basically, the society’s openness is crucial for
the innovation climate in certain regions and it also diﬀers if con-
sidering certain types of technologies. Typically, diﬀerences may be
identified with respect to controversial and non-controversial tech-
nologies. While for the latter, utility clearly dominates possible risk
it is unclear in the case of controversial technologies whether risks
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or opportunities prevail.¹⁵ As a consequence these technologies are
deeply ambivalent in the sense that strong opportunities go along
with large risks.
• Individual risk attitude. Innovations are more likely to arise if the
individuals are open-minded with respect to uncertainty. To oper-
ationalize the feature ‘risk attitude’ of private individuals usually
the results from the Eurobarometer are used.¹⁶ It regularly moni-
tors on behalf of the European Commission the public opinion. In
this context, positive indicators for innovation are preparedness to
carry risks and preferences for self employment.
• Trust in innovation actors (science, firms, and politicians). Science
and research are especially credible in countries having the fol-
lowing attributes: objective and diﬀerentiated commentatorship
on risks and opportunities, high public acceptance of institutional
frameworks, if people trust in and cooperate with other citizens and
if politicians are perceived to follow rules of good governance.
Observe that a diﬀerentiated perception and assessment of opportu-
nities and risks of new technologies is not per se negative for the devel-
opment of new technologies. In contrast: A critical discussion may help
develop the technology in a promising way. If doubts or reservations with
respect to special applications are carefully considered by science, indus-
try and policy and if the social and economic framework is chosen ade-
quately it is possible to shape a climate that is open-minded and hence
helps propagate innovation (see Hüsing 2002). As will be discussed be-
low, this aspect gains especial importance in the context of controversial
technologies.
An Application to Nanotechnologies
nanotechnologies as general purpose technologies
We now apply the argumentation detailed before on the case of nan-
otechnologies. They are perceived as being the next most important gen-
eral purpose technology, and with this they are expected to aﬀect eco-
nomic and social life significantly within the next decades. The analysis
begins with a brief illustration of why nanotechnologies actually qualify
as general purpose technology, not only from a technological but also
from an economic point of view. We then focus on the impact of de-
mand, thereby relying on the argumentation carried out before.
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Pervasiveness and technological dynamics. The generic function pro-
vided by nanotechnologies is its pervasiveness and the possibility to ar-
range single atoms. Nanotechnologies have huge potentials for improve-
ment at the beginning of their development, are open to a multitude of
possible uses, have an impact on nearly every part of economy and soci-
ety, and can be embedded in already existing technologies. This causes
major changes thereby aﬀecting production structures, network rela-
tionships, and social diﬀerentiation. As such, nanotechnologies form
part of technological platforms that organize future actions, and enable
and constrain them (see research and development; also Robinson, Rip,
and Mangematin 2006, 4ﬀ.). Figure 1 demonstrates the interdependen-
cies between several sectors, firms, and/or actors that utilize nanotech-
nologies within the production process. Looking at the simplest case,
the hierarchical interdependencies as well as the network character are
most suitably illustrated by a technology tree. Nanotechnologies repre-
sent the field of the general purpose technology. Since nanotechnologies
are still at the very beginning of their technological development, further
improvement is mostly provided by universities or research centers. This
tempers the consequences of the appropriability eﬀect discussed above in
the sense that basic research in the field of nanotechnologies is financed
by the public.¹⁷ Both universities and research centers frequently provide
the basis for spin-oﬀs which end up in the development of components
that may be used as inputs in the applying sector (as). Hence apply-
ing sectors reflect the downstream industries that actually or potentially
make use of the general purpose technology or augmented products as
intermediates. Note that remarkable eﬀorts are being made to close the
gap between science and application. One prominent way is the foun-
dation of institutions that act as a bridge between universities/research
centers and firms.¹⁸Aside from vertical relationships, horizontal linkages
exist between actors at the same level of the value chain.
In order to depict the development and implantation logics of nan-
otechnologies, let us give an example of a possible technology tree ap-
plication. Nanotechnologies have many of applying sectors, such as, the
chemical industry (as 1), microelectronics (as 2) or pharmacy (as 3).
New materials could be demanded by further downstream sectors such
as aviation industries (as 11, which use fire-resistant materials for in-
board equipment), or automobile industries (as 12, which use scratch-
resistant lacquers).
Innovational complementarities. Additionally, ict industries make
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use of nano components to augment the calculating capacity of com-
puters. Again, these are used by information technologies which have
contributed significantly to the emergence of nanotechnologies. All il-
lustrations of nano-scale eﬀects and structures are based on digitally-
constructed pictures. For more than thirty years, the capacity of com-
puters has doubled every 12 to 18 months (Moore’s law). However, within
the next several years, physical boundaries will put an end to this devel-
opment because, at nano-scales, the technological characteristics of solid
state physics cease to hold and the usual transistor will be unusable. At
this point, quantum physics will become relevant and molecules – ma-
nipulated by nanotechnologies – could replace the transistors known to-
day. Consequently, technological progress in nanotechnologies becomes
a precondition for future innovations in microtechnology, which anew
spurs technological progress in the nanotechnologies sector.
Reorganisation of work-life processes. Applied to nanotechnologies, this
argument is still diﬀuse because today these technologies are still at the
very beginning of their development. But just to get a vague idea, one
could imagine how, for example, intelligent materials that measure func-
tions of the human body and transmit the results directly to medicine
could enable people suﬀering from chronic illnesses to live their daily
lives much less dependent on regular health checks or hospital visits.
These examples show quite plainly what one can easily observe within
the field of nanotechnologies: the concrete and possible interactions
within the technology tree require a lot of coordination, and conse-
quently failures may arise.
demand for nanotechnologies by applying sectors,
and consumers and aggregate effects
Although nanotechnologies are used at the very beginning of the value
creation chain, at the end it is demand for final products that drives
the demand for nano-intermediates. To facilitate the discussion we sep-
arate the two most important factors influencing demand, namely on
the one hand, the price and the quality of the general purpose technol-
ogy, and, on the other hand the utility derived by consuming a prod-
uct that has been enhanced by nanotechnologies or that includes nano-
intermediates.
Firm demand. As argued before innovations are too few and they ar-
rive too late as a consequence of the prevailing externalities. Possibilities
for internalization are at least twofold: At a vertical level the enforcement
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of property rights gains importance. Here nano-patents may be a solu-
tion to spur innovation activities of firms along the entire value creation
chain. On the other hand, horizontal externalities could be internalized
by coordination of firms’ demands that act at the same level of the value
creation chain, e. g. firms in the aviation and the dockyards sectors could
use the same scratch-resistant surfaces. Platforms for demand coordina-
tion could basically be provided by regional institutions.¹⁹ If successful,
demand in downstream sectors increases, thereby allowing for making
use of economies of scale in the field of the upstream nanotechnology.
Private demand. Like biotechnology also nanotechnologies are contro-
versial technologies. Hence it is not per se clear whether, from an indi-
vidual point of view, chances or risks prevail. The individuals’ attitude
towards technology therefore is central. Werwatz et al. (2006; 2007) pro-
vide a ranking of attitudes and technology acceptances of citizens over
17 countries that could be used as a country’s indicator for having the
potential to become a lead market in a certain technology field.²⁰ Taking
an overall look at attitudes and acceptance of all technologies, the fol-
lowing becomes obvious: Denmark, Sweden and Finland dominate the
first three ranks, except for risk attitude, where Ireland, South Korea and
the usa are ranked first. For most indicators, Austria, Ireland and Spain
bring up the rear.
With respect to controversial technologies – and hence also with re-
spect to nanotechnologies – the following conclusions can be drawn:
Nearly 90% of the citizens in the considered countries assign a positive
eﬀect to non-controversial technologies, whereas with respect to contro-
versial technologies this rate declines to 60%. It is also possible to diﬀer-
entiate between single countries: While people in the us are optimistic
with respect to both controversial and non-controversial technologies,
citizens in the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Germany, Finland or uk
strongly diﬀerentiate with respect to certain technology fields. Within
these countries non-controversial technologies achieve the highest ac-
ceptance rate, with Germany being the leader. This means that Germans
are very optimistic with respect to low-risk technologies, but this opti-
mism clearly decreases in case of controversial technologies. This may
hamper the development of nanotechnologies in the critical countries.
In contrast, observe that this diﬀerentiated attitude may become an ad-
vantage in the long-run since a critical discussionmay provide the design
of new products or even political or institutional frameworks that foster
future innovation activities. Thus, the critical scepticism in the short run
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may provide the basis for becoming a lead market in the long run if, as
a consequence of the initially detailed discussion, products are created
that fit the needs of a large amount of consumers. Hence, this disad-
vantage with respect to regional competitiveness may turn to a future
advantage.²¹
That attitudes towards technologies diverge across societies has also
been extensively discussed in the context of the debate on the so-called
nbic (Nano-Bio-Info-Cogno) convergence:²² nbic-Convergence for
Improving Human Performance is the name of a prominent agenda
for converging technology research in the United States. In Canada, Bio-
Systemics Synthesis suggests another agenda for converging technology
research, whereas Converging Technologies for the European Knowl-
edge Society (cteks) designates the European approach. It prioritizes
the setting of a particular goal for converging technology research. This
presents challenges and opportunities for research and governance alike,
allowing for an integration of technological potential, recognition of
limits, European needs, economic opportunities, and scientific interests.
Long-run eﬀects of nanotechnologies: Nanotechnologies are expected
to introduce the next long-run wave, thereby providing continuous in-
centives for incremental innovation. As discussed before, it is inherent to
general purpose technologies that their impact on overall productivity
becomes significant only after suﬃcient complements are in the mar-
ket and after the completion of important adjustment processes. Hence,
although the recent market potentials of nanotechnologies are already
immense, it will probably take several years or even decades until overall
productivity has increased as a consequence of the use of the new general
purpose technology.
Summary and Conclusions
This paper investigates the implications of innovation processes in the
context of nanotechnologies. The focus as well as the corresponding dis-
cussion is twofold: nanotechnologies and their implications are analyzed
as controversial and as general purpose technologies, thereby disentan-
gling supply-side and demand-side arguments. As a drastic innovation,
nanotechnologies induce innovation processes in downstream sectors
which – due to feedback eﬀects – in turn aﬀect productivity and with
this innovation in the upstream nanotechnologies. The analysis is carried
out with special attention to supply-side and demand-side arguments.
Since nanotechnologies are utilized at the very beginning of the value
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creation chain it is necessary to disentangle diﬀerent parts of total de-
mand into firms’ demand for nano-components and private demand for
final products. With respect to the firms’ demand the following gains im-
portance: Innovation processes are interrelated along the value creation
chain, and feedback mechanisms work in both directions: upstream and
downstream. Due to the appropriability eﬀect, innovating firms are not
able to appropriate all benefits that are induced by their innovation ac-
tivities. As a consequence, innovations arise too late and their extent is
too low. On the other hand, nanotechnologies are highly controversial
among consumers and it is not per se clear whether opportunities or
risks in the use of final products that are augmented by nanotechnolo-
gies dominate. This again may hamper innovations in the fields of nan-
otechnologies, and the individual’s attitude towards risk and technology
becomes especially important. Both individual and firm’s demand hence
may be sub-optimally low with respect to a harmonized innovation pro-
cess. However, interventions in the innovation process carefully have to
consider at which level of the value chain they are realized.
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Notes
1 The incremental nature of technological process has been well docu-
mented by economic historians (see e. g. Rosenberg 1992).
2 Examples for an exchange of technology could be the replacement of horse
power by electricity or, in the case of products, the replacement of rubber
or steel by plastics.
3 However it is not trivial to identify possible discontinuities in the empiri-
cal data. A recent discussion about the state of the art and possibly arising
problems can be found e. g. in Christiansen (2008).
4 Hence governmental demand is most important to spur innovation in the
field of drastic innovations, while private demand may well suﬃce for in-
cremental innovations. However, this paper refrains from dealing with a
sophisticated discussion of the role of governmental demand.
5 In the following parts the abbreviation gpt stands for general purpose
technology.
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6 Note that other authors, e. g. Lipsey, Bekar, and Carlaw (1998) define gen-
eral purpose technologies slightly diﬀerent. For example these authors
stress the importance that at their emergence general purpose technolo-
gies are characterized by a wide potential of improvement, hence inducing
technological dynamics.
7 The emergence of electricity, e. g., made people independent from day-
light. This had far reaching consequences for the organization of work life
– and hence also aﬀected the daily routines not only of firms but also of
families.
8 Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) call this ‘dual inducement hypothesis’.
9 See Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) for a formal presentation of these
interdependencies.
10 Note especially the literature in the context of so called basic innovations
which induce long-run waves which sometimes are also called Kondrati-
eﬀ cycles; observe also the argumentation in Rosenberg (1996) or David
(1990).
11 Observe that one could basically extend the analysis also with respect to
the role of complementary investment of any kind.
12 This topic is discussed in detail within the literature on industrial organi-
zation. An overview can be found e. g. in Tirole (1990). The correspond-
ing impact on aggregate growth is discussed e. g. by Aghion and Howitt
(1998), Grossman and Helpman (1990) or Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004).
13 Some typical examples for lead markets are the us for personal com-
puters or drugs, Japan for fax and video, or Scandinavian countries for
mobile telephones. Germany is a typical lead market in automobile or
process technology. The latter includes mechanical engineering, measure-
ment technology, environmental technology and technical components.
The lead position is based on a strong industrial basis as well as mostly on
the preferences of industrial customers.
14 For some technologies, e. g. telecommunication or the internet, network
eﬀects also gain importance. Then the level of individual utility increases
with the number of people using the same technology.
15 Non-controversial technologies are solar energy, new propulsion tech-
nologies or medicine. Controversial technologies are biotechnology, nan-
otechnology or high-tech agriculture (see e. g. Werwatz et al. 2007).
16 Central features of the Eurobarometer include questions about health,
culture, information technologies, environmental protection, the Euro or
national defense. More information can be found at http://ec.europa.eu/
public_opinion/index_en.htm.
17 A detailed discussion about financing details in the context of basic re-
search and applied research can be found in Klodt (1995).
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18 Examples for such institutions are can in Hamburg or minatec in
Grenoble.
19 See e. g. Ott and Papilloud (2007) for an analysis of a regional institution’s
impact on the development of nanotechnologies.
20 The following countries are included: Sweden, Finland, Denmark, The
Netherlands, usa, uk, Canada, Belgium, Japan, South Korea, Ireland,
Spain, Germany, Switzerland, France, Italy and Austria. The indicators fo-
cus on questions with respect to: (i) openness towards technology and sci-
ences, (ii) basic attitudes according to Inglehart (1997), (iii) risk attitude,
(iv) trust in innovation actors, and (v) women’s participation rate.
21 Observe that more knowledge and scientific understanding does not gen-
erally lead to higher acceptance of technologies and innovation. While
knowledge increases acceptance of non-controversial technology, this re-
sult does not hold for controversial technologies. Evans and Durant (1995)
show that more knowledge raises the acceptance gap between diﬀerent
technology fields. Hence increasing knowledge does not automatically
spur acceptance rates of controversial technologies.
22 See Nordmann (2004, 19), and also Roco and Bainbridge (2002, 282). De-
fending a strict technological classification of the expression converging
technology, Roco and Bainbridge (2002, 282) refer it to the combination
of four major nbic proveniences of science and technology, namely, (1)
nanoscience and nanotechnology; (2) biotechnology and biomedicine, in-
cluding genetic engineering; (3) information technology, including ad-
vanced computing and communications; and (4) cognitive science, in-
cluding cognitive neuroscience. For a broader application of this expres-
sion, compare the description given by Wood, Jones, and Geldart (2003,
23): ‘Many of the applications arising from nanotechnology may be the
result of the convergence of several technologies.’
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